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Abstract: One of the most heated debates of the last two decades in US legal academia centers on 
customary international law’s domestic status after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. At one end, 
champions of the “modern position” support CIL’s wholesale incorporation into post-Erie 
federal common law. At the other end, “revisionists” argue that federal courts cannot apply CIL 
as federal law absent federal political branch authorization. Scholars on both sides of the Erie 
debate also make claims about what sources judges cite to when discerning CIL, which they then 
use to support their arguments regarding CIL’s domestic status. Interestingly, neither side of this 
great debate has done anything in the way of empirically looking at what US federal courts 
actually do.  In this article, we take a first cut at doing that, and what we find suggests that the 
US federal courts have, for the most part, been doing something that neither revisionism nor the 
modern position has focused on – following themselves.  After tracking the sources cited to as 
evidence of CIL in both pre-Erie and post-Erie case law, it turns out that, at all times before and 
after 1938, US federal judges have relied primarily on domestic case law when making CIL 
determinations. Not only does this finding yield thought-provoking implications for the Erie 
debate, but it also forces all of us to circle back to the bigger questions about CIL: namely, what 
is customary international law, is it even legitimate “law”, and if so, just how “international” 
does it have to be?  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
What is customary international law? More to the point, is it even “law” to begin with? 
Although both academia and the international community have recognized customary 
international law (“CIL”) as one of the two main sources of international law—the other one 
being treaties—this inquiry still lurks in the minds of those who study it.1 One way of answering 
these questions is by asking another: where does CIL get its authority from? In other words, what 
sources count as evidence of CIL such that judges may cite to them when discerning CIL norms? 
At first glance, the US Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins2 seems to 
have little to do with CIL. Nevertheless, scholars have latched onto the famous narrative about 
the death of general common law, reaching sharp disagreements over its effect on CIL’s 
domestic status in the United States. On one side, some support CIL’s wholesale incorporation 
into the “federal common law” 3 that the Supreme Court recognized on the same day that it 
                                                
♦ Duke University. For comments, thanks to Ernest A. Young, Curtis A. Bradley, Guy-Uriel Charles, Joseph Blocher 
and Melissa Morgan. The Fuller-Perdue Grant supported our research.  Chris Riccio provided research assistance 
and Guangya Liu helped us analyze the data.  
1 H.L.A HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 (1961) (questioning international law as “law” despite lacking a single 
sovereign lawmaker); see also Emily Kadens & Ernest A. Young, How Customary is Customary International 
Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 885 (2013) (studying the concept of “custom” and arguing that “medieval jurists 
had the same disputes, and the same doubts, about custom that plague contemporary lawyers, and they never came 
to an adequate resolution”). 
2 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
3 See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (holding that “whether the 
water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of ‘federal common law’ 
upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive.”). 
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decided Erie.4 On the other side, some argue that federal courts cannot apply CIL as federal law 
absent federal political branch authorization.5 Ever since the debate gained momentum in 1997, 
others have reached alternate conclusions, but all in keeping with the same question: whether, in 
light of Erie, US courts should apply CIL as federal law. The question, then, that the Erie debate 
focuses on is one about CIL’s status in the US, specifically—something distinct from the 
question of CIL’s sources, generally.  
Nevertheless, scholars within the Erie debate’s main camps have advanced their 
arguments about the “status” question against a backdrop of assumptions relating to the 
“sources” question. As we show here, most of these assumptions are about what counts as 
evidence of either “state practice” or “international consensus.”6  Interestingly, even though these 
assumptions make recurring appearances throughout the Erie literature, none of the Erie debate’s 
most notable participants substantiate them with empirical evidence. The few who do try to 
provide evidence restrict it to the anecdotal sort.7  
In the face of this silence, we decided to fill in the empirical gap ourselves.  Rather than 
choosing a side in the classic Erie debate, we hope to inform the debate by placing it against the 
context of federal judicial practice. Using a sample of US federal court cases that covers the 
period 1790 to 2015, we document how US federal courts make CIL determinations both before 
and after Erie. More specifically, our study tracks the types of sources that US federal judges 
have cited to as evidence of CIL and the frequency with which they cite to them. By observing 
                                                
4 For examples of this “modern position,” see Beth Stephens, The Law of our Land: Customary International Law as 
Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State 
Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998). 
5 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law As Federal Common Law: A Critique of 
the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 870 (1997) (articulating the “revisionist” position on Erie’s 
implications for CIL).   
6 See discussion infra Part IV.  
7 Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common 
Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997). 
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these trends before and after Erie, we put to the test three different narratives we detected in the 
Erie/CIL literature about how courts discern CIL: the “state practice” story, the “international 
consensus” story, and the “revisionist” story.8	After tracking the sources cited to as evidence of 
CIL over time, it turns out that, at all times before and after 1938, federal judges have relied 
primarily on domestic case law when making CIL determinations.  It also turns out that this and 
other findings potentially undermine all three of the Erie narratives we tested here, albeit in 
different ways.  
 As we present the study’s results, our principle aim is to hold the great Erie debaters 
accountable for reconciling their theories about the “status” issue with the reality of how the 
“sources” issue has played out in US courts. To be clear, we have no quarrel with scholars 
supporting their views about CIL’s domestic status with claims about how courts discern CIL’s 
content. Our argument is that grounding these claims in empirics can add substance to the 
arguments being made by those on both sides of the Erie debate, and it does so in a way that 
forces all of us to circle back to the bigger question about CIL’s legitimacy as law.  
I. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In general, the two main sources of international law are treaties and customary 
international law. Apart from the basic idea that CIL consists of universal, unwritten norms—or 
“customs”—the precise nature of CIL is difficult to pin down.9 The classic definition comes 
from the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), through which a legal norm reaches CIL status 
upon meeting a two-part test: first, the norm must “result from a general and consistent practice 
                                                
8 See discussion infra Section IV. 
9 See Curtis A. Bradley, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 138 (Oxford Univ. Press 2013) 
(distinguishing CIL from treaties).  
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of states,” and second, states’ adherence to this widespread practice must stem “from a sense of 
legal obligation” known as opinio juris. 10  
Despite recurring citations to the ICJ’s two-part test in textbooks and treatises, scholars 
have questioned its accuracy, focusing most of their critiques on the state practice requirement.11  
As J. Patrick Kelly notes, the empirical task of finding evidence of widespread state practice 
seems impossible, especially given the high number of nations that make up planet earth and the 
low number of nations (if any) that bother to record their state practice.12  Even if such an 
undertaking were achievable, the likelihood of finding a consistent pattern of practice across a 
multitude of diverse nations seems slim.13  Others who share Kelly’s view add that courts rarely 
do cite to state practice when making CIL determinations.14 In a recent examination of the data, 
one of us (along with Stephen Choi) found that even the ICJ has consistently ignored its own 
two-part test over the years, making only scant citations to evidence of state practice.15  
Another problem with the state practice requirement is determining what even counts as 
“practice.” Here, the puzzle is figuring out whether to restrict “state practice” to refer exclusively 
to state acts rather than broadening it to include “verbal” evidence, such as diplomatic 
                                                
10 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶ 1 (b) (asserting that “international custom” is “evidence 
of a general practice accepted as law”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES §102 (2) (1987) (explaining that CIL “results from a general and consistent practice of states 
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”); Michael Akehurst, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 44–45 (Peter Malanczuk ed., 7th ed. 1997) (describing opinio juris as the conviction by states 
that a norm is required as an international legal obligation). 
11 For an example, see J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449 (2000). 
12 See id. at 472 (noting that only the “largest and most sophisticated nations” record and publish their state 
practice); see also Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: 
A Reconciliation, 95 A.M. J. INT’L L. 757, 767 (2001) (noting that “most customs are found to exist on the basis of 
practice by fewer than a dozen states”).  
13 See Kelly, supra note 11, at 453 (claiming that CIL analysis as it is conducted in reality involves “little 
consideration of alternatives and trade-offs in reconciling diverse values and interests.”).  
14See Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 386 
(2002) (citing to Kelly’s work).  
15 See generally Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law: How do Courts do it?, in CUSTOM’S 
FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD (Curtis A. Bradley ed., forthcoming 2015) (finding that the 
ICJ, in CIL determinations, cites primarily to treaties and rarely to state practice). 
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correspondences, legal opinions, UN resolutions, or international committee reports.16  Then, 
there is the extra puzzle of determining what counts as opinio juris. Some suggest that we can 
simply infer opinio juris from state practice or that you can infer both CIL requirements from the 
same “conduct.”17  Others insist that the two requirements “must be assessed separately.”18 Still 
others claim that the same international agreements and declarations that scholars often cite to 
for state practice are in fact more indicative of opinio juris.19   
Ultimately, Kelly concludes that CIL does not stem from an inductive process, but rather, 
“CIL norms are the deductive conclusions of international law writers, judges, and advocates.”20 
This statement echoes Louis Sohn’s renowned piece, in which he argues that CIL “is made by 
the people that care; the professors, the writers of textbooks and casebooks, and the authors of 
articles in leading international law journals.”21 In under nine pages, Sohn documents how 
British, American, and international courts over time have “agreed that [international] law is 
made by the practice of states,” while ultimately citing to the writers and publicists who 
“collected and crystallized” the myriad histories of state practice.22 Add to that the fact that these 
writers and publicists are publishing their own unique views regarding CIL, and it seems that it is 
not just practice that they’re crystallizing. Should this worry us? Perhaps not, but it worries 
Kelly, who takes his critique one step further by concluding that “CIL lacks authority as law, 
because such norms are not, in fact, based on the […] general acceptance of the international 
                                                
16 See Young, supra note 14, at 86 (“Disagreements exist as to what sort of things ought to count as practice: Should 
we only count actual state actions, on the theory that they speak louder than words?”). 
17 See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the 
Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L. REV. RED CROSS 175, 178–183 (2005) 
(“When there is sufficiently dense practice, an opinio juris is generally contained within that practice and, as a 
result, it is not usually necessary to demonstrate separately the existence of opinio juris.”). 
18 John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to the International Committee of the 
Red Cross Study, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INT’L. REV. RED Cross 443, 447–448 (describing 
opinio juris as distinct from state practice).  
19 Young, supra note 14, 386–7.  
20 Kelly, supra note 11, at 475. 
21 Louis B. Sohn, Sources of International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 399, 399 (1996). 
22 Id. at 401. 
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community that a norm is obligatory.”23 Between Kelly and Sohn, it becomes clear that the 
broader questions regarding CIL’s legitimacy as law flow directly from questions about the 
proper sources and processes for discerning CIL norms.  
As we shall see, many of the arguments for and against CIL’s status as federal common 
law in the US circle back to these questions about how courts should determine CIL, the extent 
to which the classic CIL definition plays a role in these determinations, what counts as “state 
practice” versus opinio juris, and whether courts’ reliance on certain sources—such as treatises 
and academic writings— undermines what CIL discernment is supposed to look like. First, 
however, we must revisit the case around which the “status” debate revolves.  
II. ERIE RAILROAD V. TOMPKINS 
 Justice Frankfurter put it best when he noted that Erie “did not merely overrule a 
venerable case. It overruled a particular way of looking at law.”24 That venerable case was Swift 
v. Tyson, which contains the most famous application of the “general common law” that U.S. 
courts developed before 1938.25 The general common law was neither state nor federal: it was 
just “the common law” that existed independently of any sovereign authority.26 Under this 
natural law27 conception of Swiftian common law as something stemming from “reason and 
morality,”28 any judge in any court could determine the correct common law rule based on his 
own understanding of the law. More specifically, the independent, uniform nature of general 
                                                
23 Kelly, supra note 11, at 452. 
24 Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945). 
25 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1938). 
26 Stephens, supra note 4, at 410 (describing pre-Erie common law).   
27 See George Rutherglen, Reconstructing Erie: A Comment on the Perils of Legal Positivism, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 
285 (1993) (describing general common law as “a form of natural law”). 
28 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Varieties and Complexities of Doctrinal Change: Historical Commentary, 1901-1945, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 289–90 (David L. Sloss, Michael 
D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011) (describing the “general law”).  
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common law29 meant that judges “found” rather than “made” law, which they did by culling 
together all of the available sources from the common law world to identify the “right” rule.30 In 
his famous dissents, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes derided the “transcendental body of law”31 
that the Swift regime upheld, arguing that the common law is “not a brooding omnipresence in 
the sky.”32 Nearly a century after Swift, the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie vindicated Justice 
Holmes’s critique when it declared that “there is no federal general common law.”33  
 The Court in Erie declared the Swift doctrine unconstitutional, holding that federal courts 
“in applying the doctrine . . . have invaded rights which . . . are reserved by the Constitution to 
the several States.”34 In abolishing the general common law, Justice Brandeis relied heavily on 
Justice Holmes’s arguments: 
“‘[B]ut law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority 
behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the 
common law generally but the law of that State existing by the authority of that State without regard to 
what it may have been in England or anywhere else. . . .’”35  
 In channeling Justice Holmes, Erie established that—because the common law is not a 
uniform, “august corpus”36 in the sky—the common law is something judges “make” rather than 
“find.”37 From Erie’s legal realism flowed the legal positivist idea that judges needed “some 
                                                
29 See Swift, 41 U.S. at 19 (asserting that the law cannot be one thing in Rome and something else in Athens).  
30 See id.at 18 (“In the ordinary use of language, it will hardly be contended, that the decisions of Courts constitute 
laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not, of themselves, laws”). See also R. Jackson, 
The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A.J. 609, 612 (1938) (asserting that a court “does not make the law but 
merely finds or declares the law, and so its decisions simply constitute evidence of what the law is, which another 
court is free to reject in favor of better evidence to be found elsewhere.”).  
31 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928). 
32 Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917).   
33 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
34 Id. at 77. 
35 Id. at 79 (citing Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532–36 (1928)). 
36 Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533. 
37 William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 19, 23 
(2007) (noting that “if judges ‘made’ rather than ‘found’ the common law, it followed that they needed lawmaking 
authority. It was this change that led ultimately to Erie.”).  
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definite” lawmaking authority from a sovereign source in order to “make” law.38 After Erie, the 
only valid sovereign sources under which federal courts can legitimately make law would be 
either the Constitution or some form of political branch authorization (a statute). 39 
 On the same day that it issued the Erie decision, the Supreme Court also decided 
Hinderlider v. La Plata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., in which it clarified that federal judges have 
the power to make “federal common law” in cases pertaining to “uniquely federal concerns” 
where Congress has yet to enact a statute that governs.40 In its post-Erie case law, the Supreme 
Court carved out “enclaves” of this new form of federal judge-made law, upholding it as 
“genuine federal law that binds the states under the Supremacy Clause and potentially establishes 
Article III and statutory ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.”41  
Legal realists consider the distinction between “finding” and “making” law a false one. 
Technically speaking, judges are always “making” common law, pulling sources together and 
determining the rule from their independent judgment (although, even under federal common 
law, judges will almost never admit that they are “making” law). The process never changed, 
                                                
38 See id. and accompanying text.  But see Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal 
Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673, 674 (1998) (challenging the conventional view that Erie's “constitutional holding 
relies on a commitment to legal positivism.”). 
39 See Dodge, supra note 37, at 24 (“Under Erie's own positivist view . . . authority for the additional requirement of 
incorporation would have to be found in a statute or the Constitution. If it were simply the product of judicial 
lawmaking, it would be illegitimate.”).  
40 See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (stating that the issue of 
interstate water apportionment “is a question of ‘federal common law’ upon which neither the statutes nor the 
decisions of either State can be conclusive.”). For an explanation of when federal judges apply federal common law, 
see Koh, supra note 4, at 1831–2. 
41 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964) (“[T]here are enclaves of federal judge-made 
law which bind the [s]tates”); Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary 
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 878 (2007) (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s references to federal enclaves). 
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although the label for it may have after Hinderlider. The Erie decision itself reflects this legal 
realism, and most scholars in the Erie/CIL debate seem to have accepted it as well.42   
 On a superficial level, Erie’s story about the death of general common law and the birth 
of federal common law has little to do with CIL’s legal status in the United States. Before Erie, 
US courts applied CIL without question and in a wide variety of contexts, including admiralty 
cases, state boundary disputes, and other interstate matters.43 Even Swift v. Tyson’s analysis of 
“the law merchant” hints at the courts’ commonplace application of “the law of nations.”44 In 
case anyone doubted CIL’s place in US common law before 1938, Justice Gray famously 
clarified it in The Paquete Habana when he upheld the law of nations as “part of our law.”45 
Upon further reflection, Justice Gray’s assertion begs the question: in what sense was CIL “part 
of our law” before Erie? More importantly, did the answer to this question change after Erie 
eliminated the unconstitutional “august corpus” of general common law?46  
 The text of the US Constitution does not answer these questions on its face, although it 
does mention that Congress has to power to “define and punish offenses against the “law of 
                                                
42 Jeremy Rabkin, Off the Track or Just Down the Line? From Erie Railroad to Global Governance, 10 J.L. ECON. 
& POL'Y 251, 290 (2013) (“The positivist premise of Erie can’t be taken seriously, because the same justices who 
endorsed Erie were quite ready to embrace a great deal of judicial improvisation in other areas.”). See also id. (“In 
later years, of course, courts would continue to invoke Erie as a caution against judge-made law—while confidently 
asserting ever more elaborate judge-made rules purporting to have some relation to vague phrases in the 
Constitution.”);  Stephens, supra note 4, at 437 (asserting the Supreme Court in Erie “was not rejecting the entire 
concept of federal court lawmaking, but rather the particular kind developed under the rubric of Swift v. Tyson.”). 
43 See e.g. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (“The law of nations as well as the law of nature is of 
‘origin divine.’”); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133 (1795) (applying the law of nations to a prize case); United States v. 
Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820) (adopting the definition of “piracy” under the law of nations); State of Iowa v. State of Ill., 
147 U.S. 1 (1893) (applying the “thalweg” rule to a state boundary case). 
44  See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 19 (1938) (The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared . . . to 
be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world.”). See also Michael D. 
Ramsey, Customary International Law in the Supreme Court, 1901-1945, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 28, at 228 (explaining that the common law of bills of 
exchange stems from the “law merchant,” which “was often described as a branch of the law of nations”).  
45  The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
46  Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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nations.”47 One of the first attempts at addressing Erie’s implications for CIL came in 1939 from 
Philip Jessup, a Columbia Law professor who eventually served as a judge for the ICJ.48 In an 
article for the American Journal of International Law, Jessup concluded that “any attempt to 
extend the doctrine of the Tompkins case to international law should be repudiated by the 
Supreme Court.”49 He noted that “applying international law in our courts involves the foreign 
relations of the United States and can thus be brought within a federal power.”50 Thus, he 
reasoned, it “would be as unsound as it would be unwise to make our state courts our ultimate 
authority for pronouncing the rules of international law.”51 
Since Jessup’s writings, other international law scholars have taken on the Erie narrative, 
reaching diverse conclusions—and ferocious disagreements—about Erie’s effect on CIL 
application in the United States. Over time, this chorus of differing opinions has culminated into 
the great Erie debate that we turn to now. 
 III. THE ERIE DEBATE: A STATUS QUESTION 
 Despite some diversity of opinion within camps, the debate concerning CIL’s domestic 
status after Erie centers on two main stances: the “modern position” and “revisionism”.  
In its most extreme form, the modern position supports the automatic, wholesale 
incorporation of CIL into federal common law after Erie.52 In other words, federal judges can 
“make” CIL using the common-lawmaking authority that they retained after Hinderlider, and 
                                                
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 10.  
48 Rabkin, supra note 42, at 254 (describing Jessup’s role in the Erie debate). 
49 Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740, 
743 (1939). 
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 See e.g. Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors 
Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 376 n.31 (1997) (“I would be content to label the incorporated 
[CIL] rules as rules of federal common law.”).   
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CIL would have the force of federal law that both establishes Article III jurisdiction and 
preempts inconsistent state laws under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.53   
Academics from the modern camp do not necessarily deny CIL’s pre-Erie status as 
general common law.54 Nevertheless, one of the underlying premises of the modern position is 
that CIL has always—both before and after Erie—had the status of federal law insofar that it 
governs foreign relations: an area of distinctly “federal interest” ever since the time of our 
Forefathers.55 Others point to Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the Constitution, as well as to 
certain federal statutes56, as additional “explicit grant[s] of authority” for federal courts “to 
define and fashion federal rules with regard to the law of nations.”57 If these are correct and CIL 
has always been part of US federal law, then federal judges who apply CIL after Erie are simply 
exercising a legitimate authority that they never lost.58 In other words, CIL does not require an 
extra layer of domestic authorization before judges can incorporate it into post-Erie federal 
common law because CIL never constituted “unauthorized” general common law to begin 
                                                
53  See e.g. id. at 383 (claiming that “the modern position entails the conclusion that, in the face of congressional 
silence, customary international law will be supreme over the laws of the States.”); Louis Henkin, International Law 
as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1559–61 (1984) (asserting that customary international law has 
“the status of federal law for purposes of supremacy to state law” and that “there is now general agreement” that 
international law cases “are within the judicial power ... under [A]rticle III. . . .”); Stephens, supra note 4, at 397 
(arguing that a CIL determination “is a federal question, which triggers federal court jurisdiction and on which 
federal court decisions are binding on the states.”).  
54 See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2354 (1991) [hereinafter 
Transnational] (“throughout the early nineteenth century, American courts regularly construed and applied the 
unwritten law of nations as part of the ‘general common law,’ . . . without regard to whether it should be 
characterized as federal or state.”); Henkin, supra note 53, at 1557–58 (describing “the reign of Swift v. Tyson” and 
how “[e]arly in our history, the question whether international law was state law or federal law was not an issue: it 
was ‘the common law.’”). 
55 See generally Stephens, supra note 4 (arguing that the framers of the Constitution intended for the federal 
government to enforce the “law of nations” as it governed foreign affairs, and that pre-Erie international law cases 
applied a “precursor” of federal common law). See also Koh, supra note 4, at 1841 (“[T]he so-called ‘modern 
position’ extends at least as far back as Alexander Hamilton. Far from being novel, the ‘modern position’ is actually 
a long-accepted, traditional reading of the federal courts’ function.”); Neuman, supra note 52, at 392 (upholding the 
modern position as a “200-year-old practice of judicially incorporating customary international law.”). 
56 See Koh, supra note 4 at 1835 n.60 (citing the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
as federal statutes that “expressly delegate to the federal courts authority to derive federal common law rules from 
established norms of customary international law.”).  
57 Id. at 1835. 
58 See id. at 1841 (“Both before and after Erie, the federal courts issued rulings construing the law of nations. Erie 
never intended to alter or disrupt that practice, which has continued as the ‘new’ federal common law.”). 
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with.59  To the extent that Erie’s positivist underpinnings do touch CIL, some of the modern 
position’s supporters argue that CIL already has a “definite authority behind it” because it has 
always been grounded in the practice of sovereign states (and not some mystical body of law in 
the sky).60  
The modern position became the mainstream academic view in the decades immediately 
following the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. The 
world of legal academia threw a fit in 1997, however, when two enfants terribles, Curtis Bradley 
and Jack Goldsmith, took on the international law establishment in the US in their now-classic 
“emperor has no clothes” critique of the establishment view.  Calling the establishment’s view 
the “modern position”, theirs was a manifesto for “revisionism.”61  
The revisionist view begins with the “uncontroversial” premise that pre-Erie CIL had the 
status of general common law.62 After Erie, they reason, federal courts cannot apply CIL as 
federal law without domestic, positive incorporation from the federal branches, either through 
the Constitution or a federal statute.63 In their vigorous attack on the modern position’s historical 
and legal claims, Bradley and Goldsmith conclude that “CIL should not have the status of federal 
                                                
59 See Dodge, supra note 37, at 23–24 (arguing that the “original understanding” of Erie permits federal courts to 
apply CIL without the revisionists’ “additional requirement” of “positive authority for the incorporation” of CIL into 
US law, and this is so because of CIL’s positivist foundation).  
60 See id. (“[B]y 1938, customary international law already rested on a positivist foundation of state practice and 
consent. Customary international law did have ‘some definite authority behind it’ — the consent of nations reflected 
in their practice”).  
61 Bradley and Goldsmith were both in their first years in the academy, Bradley at the University of Colorado Law 
School and Goldsmith at the University of Chicago Law School. For the article that set off the firestorm, see Bradley 
& Goldsmith, supra note 5; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy of International 
Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997) (explaining that “the legitimacy of human rights 
litigation is what is really at stake in debates over the modern position.”). For earlier versions of the revisionist 
stance, see A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1995) 
(criticizing the “federalization” of CIL in international cases brought before US courts); Phillip R. Trimble, A 
Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986) (arguing that US courts had been 
applying CIL in a way that was irreconcilable with American political tradition). 
62 Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 41, at 882.  
63 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 870 (arguing that “in the absence of federal political branch 
authorization, CIL is not a source of federal law.”).  
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common law,” asserting that any arguments in favor of CIL’s automatic incorporation into 
federal common law “depart from well-accepted notions of American representative democracy, 
. . . separation of powers, and federalism.”64 In return, proponents of the modern position 
launched equally vigorous attacks on Bradley and Goldsmith’s piece  shortly after its 
publication.65  Things got so heated at one point that José Alvarez, giving the 2007 Presidential 
Address at the American Society of International Law meetings, referred to Bradley and 
Goldsmith as among the “four horsemen of the [constitutional] apocalypse.”66 Alvarez was by no 
means the only prominent legal academic to see Bradley and Goldsmith as having started a 
dangerous trend.  Peter Spiro, in an article in Foreign Affairs in 2000, pointed to the Bradley and 
Goldsmith paper as having given birth to a “New Sovereigntist” movement, whose core belief 
was in an anti-international form of American exceptionalism.67  The two sides to the great Erie 
debate have been at it ever since, with several others joining in the discussion and contributing 
their own alternative perspectives regarding CIL’s post-Erie domestic status.68   
No matter whom you ask, all players in the Erie debate ground their arguments on the 
same historical narrative. To begin with, most of the literature on CIL’s domestic legal status 
mentions the federal courts’ silence on the subject during the decades immediately following 
                                                
64 Id. at 821. 
65 See e.g. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 7; Koh, supra note 4; Stephens, supra note 4; Neuman, supra note 52.  
66 José E. Alvarez, The Future of Our Society, 102 ASIL 499 (2008). The other two horsemen, according to Alvarez, 
were John Yoo of UC Berkeley and Ernest Young of Duke University.   
67 Peter Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and its False Prophets, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Dec. 
2000), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2000-11-01/new-sovereigntists-american-
exceptionalism-and-its-false-prophets. 
68 See generally Young, supra note 14 (advancing an “an intermediate solution” of treating CIL as “general” law—a 
category of law that is neither state nor federal, that would not preempt contrary state policies, and that both state 
and federal courts may apply in accordance with traditional conflict of laws principles). See also Michael D. 
Ramsey, International Law As Non-Preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 555, 577 (2002) (arguing that courts 
should treat CIL as a form of non-preemptive federal law).  
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Erie.69 Some attribute this silence to several factors: the decrease of CIL-related cases, the 
increased codification of CIL in treaties, and the rarity with which state and federal courts 
reached conflicting interpretations of CIL.70  
As far as almost everyone is concerned, the Supreme Court did not expressly address 
CIL’s post-Erie status until 1964, when it decided Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. 71 The 
Court in Sabbatino ruled that the “act of state doctrine” applied even in cases where state acts 
violated international law. 72 In the process, the Court also held that the act of state doctrine was 
a rule of federal common law, binding on the states and flowing from the federal governments’ 
authority to determine issues of foreign relations.73 In holding that the act of state doctrine was 
immune from Erie’s purview, the Court cited to Jessup, finding that he correctly “recognized the 
potential dangers were Erie extended to legal problems affecting international relations.”74   
Although supporters of the modern position initially considered Sabbatino a “setback” 
for CIL application in US courts,75 they eventually latched onto the Court’s reference to Jessup 
juxtaposed with its characterization of the act of state doctrine as federal common law, and used 
                                                
69 See Stephens, supra note 4, at 440 (stating that the Supreme Court did not address CIL’s post-Erie domestic status 
until “twenty-five years after [Philip] Jessup’s [1938] article . . . .”); Koh, supra note 4, at 1833 (“More than a 
quarter century [after Erie] would pass before the Supreme Court clarified whether customary international law rules 
should be characterized as state or federal law.”). See also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 821 (“[F]or several 
decades after Erie, it remained an open (and generally unaddressed) question whether CIL was part of this new 
federal common law.”).  
70Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 827–28 (adding that in the decades between Erie and Sabbatino, “CIL was 
not yet viewed as regulating the relations between a nation and its citizens; it thus generated few conflicts with 
traditional areas of domestic lawmaking.”). But see id. at 828 (citing Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 
1948)) (pointing to Bergman as the “one reported decision in the quarter century following Erie that did address the 
domestic legal status of CIL” and that “reached a conclusion contrary to Jessup’s.”).  
71 But see id. at 836 (asserting that Sabbatino did not address CIL’s domestic legal status).  
72See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (declining to answer the question of whether the 
Cuban government violated CIL when it expropriated a sugar shipment from a US-owned company).  
73 Id. at 425–27.  
74 See id. at 425 (citing to Jessup, supra note 49) (“[I]t seems fair to assume that the Court did not have rules like the 
act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.”). 
75 See Koh, Transnational, supra note 54, at 2363 (1991) (suggesting that Sabbatino initially “cast a profound chill 
upon the willingness of United States domestic courts to interpret or articulate norms of international law. . . .”). See 
also John R. Stevenson, The State Department and Sabbatino—“Ev’n Victors Are by Victories Undone”, 58 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 707, 708 (1964) (criticizing how Sabbatino forecloses US courts from applying CIL). 
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it as a basis for arguing that the Supreme Court did incorporate CIL into federal common law.76 
In response, Bradley and Goldsmith point out that “Sabbatino clearly indicated that the act of 
state doctrine was neither required by nor an element of CIL,” and therefore, “the Court’s 
statement that the act of state doctrine is a federal common law rule does not extend to questions 
of CIL.”77  
The literature identifies the 1980’s as the next phase of the Erie saga, which heralded the 
rise of international human rights litigation in the United States.78 Many of these lawsuits came 
under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), which grants federal district courts jurisdiction over “any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States.”79 In 1984, the Second Circuit issued the first decision to approve the use of 
the ATS in international human rights litigation: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.80 In finding that official 
torture “violates established norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of 
nations,”81 the court in Filartiga upheld Article III jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claim on the 
basis that it arose under the ATS.82 In reaching this conclusion, the court asserted that CIL “has 
always been part of the federal common law.”83   
Despite what appears to be a blatant embrace of the modern position, Bradley and 
Goldsmith argue that Filartiga does not provide reliable support for CIL’s status as federal 
                                                
76 See e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its 
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 876 (1987) [hereinafter United States Sovereignty] (“The Supreme Court . . .  
eliminated th[e] historic confusion of international with common law when it recognized in 1964 that international 
law is not state but federal law”); Koh, supra note 4 at 1833–35 (arguing that rather than “shy[ing] away from 
interpreting questions of customary international law,” the Sabbatino Court “construed customary international law 
to determine that international law neither compelled nor required application of the act of state doctrine.”). 
77Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 859 n.284 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421). 
78 See generally id. at 831–34 (dedicating an entire subsection of their article to Filartiga’s effect on the post-Erie 
CIL question).   
79 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2015). 
80 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (reviewing Paraguayan citizens’ suit for acts of torture 
committed in Paraguay).  
81 Id. at 880.  
82 Id. at 887. 
83 Id. at 885. 
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common law because the Second Circuit “relied uncritically on pre-Erie precedents,” all of 
which applied CIL as general common law, not federal law.84 Furthermore, they emphasize that 
the Filartiga court was just a circuit court and that—like other lower courts—it focused only on 
using CIL’s status as federal law to ensure jurisdiction, as opposed to addressing other issues 
such as preempting state law.85 The revisionists do concede, however, that the federal courts 
became more accepting of the modern position after the Filartiga line of cases, from which a 
“new CIL” emerged.86 This “new CIL” differs from “traditional CIL” in three main respects: it is 
“less related to state practice, can develop rapidly, and purports to regulate a state's treatment of 
its own citizens” as opposed to matters between states. 87 
Most of the more recent discussions about Erie and CIL focus on ATS litigation, 
especially the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.88 As one might 
expect, the modern position’s supporters read Sosa as the Supreme Court’s ringing endorsement 
of customary international law as federal common law in ATS cases,89 while revisionists claim 
that Sosa is “best read as rejecting that position.”90 At this rate, it might take more than Sosa to 
resolve the Erie debate.  
                                                
84 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 834. 
85 Id. at 831. 
86 See generally id. (referring to Filartiga as one of the “twin pillars” of the modern position, the other one being the 
Restatement (Third)). Id. at 838–842 (distinguishing the “new CIL” from “traditional” CIL).  
87 Id. at 842.  
88 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (reviewing one Mexican national’s claim against another for 
violating CIL’s prohibition on arbitrary arrest).  
89 See William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary International Law in the U.S. Legal System After Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 87, 95–96 (2004) (arguing that the Sosa majority had rejected 
many of Bradley’s, Goldsmith’s, and Justice Scalia’s revisionist premises); see also Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is 
the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 104 n.27 (2004) (stating that Sosa 
“settled part of [the Erie] debate, recognizing that some CIL is federal common law.”). 
90See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 41, at 870 (granting that there are still “a number of contexts in 
addition to the ATS in which it is appropriate for courts to develop federal common law by reference to CIL” after 
Sosa).   
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We decided not to undertake that task ourselves. Instead, what interested us were the 
empirical assumptions underlying a number of the arguments that the two sides were making, 
and the question of whether those arguments might be different had the authors had data instead 
of anecdote. We discovered that both camps defend their stances on CIL’s domestic status by 
relying—to some extent—on claims about CIL’s sources. Some of these claims stem from the 
Erie literature, while others originated from academic writings long preceding the debate.  In the 
discussion that follows, we explore these different claims about how pre- and post-Erie courts 
discerned the content of CIL norms.   
IV. CIL AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL PRACTICE: A SOURCES QUESTION 
When contrasting the modern position’s answers to the “sources” question with the 
revisionists’ answers, we found it helpful to think of CIL in terms of its pre-Erie and post-Erie 
forms. This, in turn, required a history lesson on how academics narrate the story of CIL in US 
courts from the seventeenth century up until the present. Along the way, we began developing 
predictions about what we could expect to see if we tracked the sources US federal courts cited 
to across the centuries as evidence of CIL. Our predictions revolve around three narratives that 
we discerned in the Erie/CIL literature, two from the modern camp and one from the revisionist 
camp. For ease of reference, we refer to them as the “state practice” story, the “international 
consensus” story, and the “revisionist” story. 
a. CIL in US Courts: 1700-1937 
By now, basically everyone in academia agrees that pre-Erie courts treated CIL as 
general common law, which neither preempts inconsistent state law nor creates an independent 
basis for federal jurisdiction.91 We also know that pre-1938 courts regarded general common law 
                                                
91 See sources cited supra note 54; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text.  
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as stemming from natural law principles92 and from British common law.93 Unsurprisingly, US 
courts by the late eighteenth century also regarded CIL as part of the natural law and of the 
common law inherited from England.94  Throughout this era, writers such as Hugo Grotius, 
Emmerich de Vattel, and William Blackstone received credit for laying the foundation of 
international law upon natural law principles.95   
That said, even Vattel developed a theory of “voluntary” or “positive” CIL, a form of 
CIL that was based on the actual practices of states.96  In fact, the conventional academic 
narrative is that CIL developed a positivistic streak by the end of the nineteenth century.97 This 
positivism appeared through the rhetoric of state practice, which courts often referred to as the 
“common consent” of states or the “usages of civilized nations.”98 The famous The Paquete 
Habana, Antelope and Scotia cases are often invoked as illustrative of the positivist CIL move in 
the pre-Erie days.99   
                                                
92 See Dodge, supra note 37, at 22–23 (discussing the natural law basis for eighteenth century common law and 
explaining how the common law later shifted toward positivism because of Erie).    
93 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 15 (1938) (citing to English court decisions and concluding that “In the American 
Courts, so far as we have been able to trace the [decisions], the same doctrine seems generally but not universally to 
prevail.”). 
94  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 822–23 (citing to The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 297 (1814); Thirty 
Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 161 
(1795) (Iredell, J.); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820)). 
95 See Sloss et al., International Law in the Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 28, at 8 (specifying Vattel’s The Law of Nations and Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England as the “two works” that “in particular framed the early American view of the 
law of nations”); see also Sohn, supra note 21, at 399 (referring to Grotius and Vattel as two of the “‘fathers of 
international law’”). 
96 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED TO THE 
CONDUCT AND THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS lxv–lxvi (Joseph Chitty trans., 7th ed. 1849).  
97 See David J. Bederman, Customary International Law in the Supreme Court, 1861-1900, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 28, at 97–100 (explaining the “positivist 
outlooks” of Supreme Court’s CIL determinations throughout the nineteenth century). See also Neuman, supra note 
52, at 373, 373 n.12 (stating that “positivist jurisprudence superseded naturalist jurisprudence as the prevailing 
approach to international law” during the nineteenth century, and that “[i]t would therefore be a mistake to associate 
the pre-Erie regime with a naturalist approach to international law.”);  
98 See Bederman, supra note 97, at 95, 109 (citing to Hilton v. Guyot and to the the prize cases for “common 
consent.”).  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 838–839 (asserting that the “traditional CIL” that prevailed 
before World War II was more closely tied to state practice). 
99 See INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 36, 97, 99, 109 (David L. 
Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011).   
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We should note here, however, that some scholars who discerned this positivist trend also 
say that the US Supreme Court merely paid lip service to CIL’s basis in state practice while 
rarely ever citing to concrete, empirical evidence of such practice. 100 Among them is Michael 
Ramsey, who also asserts that the international law positivism of The Paquete Habana faded in 
the early twentieth century, as the fusion of CIL with general common law became even more 
pronounced.101 After all, since general common law was “based on principles of reason and 
morality, the merger of customary international law into ‘general law’” presumably “meant that 
American courts would look to those principles, not to state behavior, to determine customary 
international law’s content.”102 Other scholars, such as David Bederman, note that judges were 
already segueing into a positivistic view of CIL as early as the Antelope case in 1820, but that 
they also continued using naturalistic language well into the late nineteenth century.103  
Despite these mixed opinions about pre-Erie reliance on state practice, academics agree 
that the centuries preceding Erie comprised the golden era of the international treatises and 
digests. 104 To the extent that courts did cite to state practice, they often delegated the empirical 
task of gathering evidence of practice to the digest writers of England, France, and the United 
                                                
100 Bederman, supra note 97, at 104 (“Even by the time of The Scotia and The Paquete Habana . . . even as the 
rhetoric of the Court’s decisions seemed to emphasize [CIL] as the empirical product of state practice, the evidence 
of such norms that the Court chose to cite was often not so inductive.”).   
101 Ramsey, supra note 44, at 227 (“General common law, as the early-twentieth century [Supreme] Court applied it, 
was not heavily tied to customary practices; as it gradually subsumed international law, the positivism of The 
Paquete Habana (and its strict link to nation’s practices) also declined.”).  
102  Purcell, Jr., supra note 28, 289–90. 
103 Bederman, supra note 97, at 92.  
104 See Sloss et al., supra note 95, at 8 (“For the content of the law of nations, early Americans relied heavily on 
European treatise writers(‘publicists’), including Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, Burlamaqui, Wolff, and 
Rutherforth. Of the publicists, they turned most often to Vattel.”). For a thorough, early twentieth century 
perspective on how publicists shaped the law of nations in centuries past, see generally Jesse S. Reeves, The 
Influence of the Law of Nature Upon International Law in the United States, 3 AM. J. INT’L L. 547 (1909) 
(describing early academia’s comingling of international law with the natural law tradition through the works of 
Locke, Hooker, Grotius, Vattel, Blackstone, Wilson, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, and Bynkershoek). 
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States.105 Thinking ahead, we felt confident that if we tracked the sources judges cited to as 
authority for CIL, the pre-Erie data would yield high citation rates to academic sources 
regardless of whether courts relied on these sources for their naturalistic or positivistic content. 
As for state practice, we temporarily left Ramsey to the side and decided to test the traditional 
academic consensus that pre-Erie courts cited heavily to the actual practices of states.  
Of course, if we assume that US courts actually follow the traditional definition of CIL, 
then we should expect high citation rates to actual practice in both pre- and post-Erie CIL 
determinations. In fact, some of the modern position’s scholars from the Erie debate imply in 
their writings that this did in fact occur. Here, we uncovered the first narrative that we test in our 
study, which we decided to call the “state practice” story.  
Under this narrative, international state practice serves as the basis of CIL’s pre-Erie and 
post-Erie legitimacy as federal law. Remember: Erie injected legal positivism into common-
lawmaking when it declared that “law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not 
exist without some definite authority behind it.”106 Thus, some champions of the modern position 
challenge the revisionist calls for CIL’s positive incorporation into federal law by arguing that 
CIL has always come from a positive authority: “the consent of nations reflected in their 
practice.”107  
For example, after citing to The Paquete Habana and The Scotia, William Dodge asserts 
that “[b]ecause positive customary international law [before Erie] was grounded in state practice 
and consent, it was not open to the same charge of judicial lawmaking as the common law more 
                                                
105 For thorough review of how the pre-Erie publicists shaped CIL determinations, see e.g. Edwin D. Dickenson, 
Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 239 (1932); Harold H. Sprout, Theories as 
to the Applicability of International Law in the Federal Courts of the United States, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 280 (1931); 
Sohn, supra note 21, at 400. 
106 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & 
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) 
107 Dodge, supra note 37, at 24. 
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generally.”108  In other words, the fact that federal courts have no authority to make substantive 
law after Erie does not matter because, by 1938, CIL did have “some definite authority behind 
it” in the form of state practice.109 For Dodge, CIL’s “positivist foundation” renders superfluous 
the revisionists’ “additional requirement” of “positive authority for the incorporation” of CIL 
into the US legal system.110  
In a famous variation on the modern position, Louis Henkin argued that CIL is “like” 
federal common law insofar as it counts as federal law that trumps inconsistent state law and 
establishes federal jurisdiction.111 He distinguishes CIL from federal common law, however, as 
something judges “find” rather than “create,” claiming that judges find CIL “by examining the 
practices and attitudes of foreign states.”112 If judicial practice does reflect Dodge and Henkin’s 
views, then our data should yield high citation rates to variables indicative of state practice, both 
before and after Erie. This result would not only vindicate traditional conceptions of CIL, but it 
would also dispel revisionist fears of undemocratic judges making up CIL norms. Neither Dodge 
nor Henkin explicitly address which sources count as “practice,” so we decided to test the more 
traditional, uncontroversial sources for this narrative, such as the concrete acts of states. 
b. CIL in US Courts 1938-1980 
The decades immediately following Erie presented us with a special puzzle. As far as 
almost everyone is concerned, the question of Erie’s effect on CIL’s domestic status remained 
virtually unanswered for a few decades, or least until either the Sabbatino or Filartiga decisions 
surfaced.113 What, then, was happening in those thirty or forty years after Erie?  
                                                
108 Id. at 23. 
109 Id. at 23–24. 
110 Id. at 24.  
111 Henkin, supra note 53, at 1561–62 (1984) (distinguishing CIL from federal common law).  
112 Henkin, United States Sovereignty, supra note 76, at 876 (1987).  
113  See Discussion supra Section III.  
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Overall, fewer CIL-related cases reached the courts during this era for several reasons, 
such as the disappearance of nineteenth century subjects where CIL used to be relevant (such as 
piracy) and certain developments in constitutional law adjudication.114 Most of the CIL-related 
cases that did emerge in this time period were not direct application cases; they drew upon CIL 
norms, but were ultimately governed by the statutes and treaties that codified those norms.115  
Thus, we posited that the numbers might increase for citations to treaties and statutes, but we did 
not expect any dramatic changes in the data between 1938 and 1980. If the literature is correct 
and if no one challenged CIL’s domestic legitimacy until Sabbatino or Filartiga, then whatever 
judges did before Erie must have still seemed legitimate to judges deciding cases before 1964 
(Sabbatino) or at least 1980 (Filartiga).  
One particular case, however, lead us to consider another possibility. On the same day 
that the Supreme Court decided Erie and Hinderlider, it also decided Guaranty Trust Co. of New 
York v. United States, where the issue was whether the Russian Government could 
claim sovereign immunity against New York's statute of limitations for a case brought in a 
US federal court.116 Writing for the majority, Justice Stone acknowledged the ancient principle 
of quod nullum tempus ocurrit regi ("no time runs against the king") as one that stemmed from 
British law.117 He concluded, however, that if this principle still had any validity, it stemmed 
from “its uniform survival in the United States” and from public policy rather than from “any 
inherited notions of the general privilege of the king.”118 Curiously, when the Court declined to 
                                                
114 Ramsey, supra note 44, at 226, 235. 
115 Id. at 235.   
116 Guar. Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938). 
117 Id. at 132 (citing to two British cases for support). 
118 See id. (“[I]ndependently of the royal prerogative once thought sufficient to justify it, the rule is supportable now 
because its benefit and advantage extend to every citizen . . . and its uniform survival in the United States has been 
generally accounted for and justified on grounds of policy rather than upon any inherited notions of the personal 
privilege of the king.”).  
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apply the rule, the majority cited exclusively to US cases when asserting that international law 
did not support its application.119  
As Michael Ramsey points out, the only question under Erie “should have been whether the 
New York Courts would apply the limitations period—so Stone must have thought that Erie for 
some reason did not apply.”120 Perhaps Justice Stone saw this foreign relations matter as a 
distinctly federal interest where the federal common law could displace state law. 121 Then again, 
perhaps we were reading too much into the fact that the Supreme Court decided this case on the 
same day that it decided Erie and Hinderlider. Ultimately, we posited that if the Guaranty Trust 
Co. case does give us an indication of what to expect, we would see more citations to domestic 
case law for CIL during the period 1938-1980. Overall, however, we predicted that we would see 
only some change during this period, all the while believing that the more dramatic shifts in our 
data would not emerge until much later.  
c. CIL in US Courts: 1980-2015 
As far as many Erie scholars are concerned, the period between 1980 and the present 
constitutes a key chapter in the “status” debate about CIL. Many of them credit the Filartiga line 
of cases and the publication of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States in the 1980’s for the federal courts’ alleged acceptance of the modern position.122 
While examining this episode in the Erie saga, we uncovered two more narratives about how 
judges discern CIL: the “international consensus” story and the “revisionist” story.  
                                                
119 See id. (“Diligent search of counsel has revealed no judicial decision supporting such an application of the rule in 
this or any other country.”).   
120 See Ramsey, in supra note 44, at 250 (emphasis in original). 
121 See id. (“Put together with Hinderlider, Pink, Belmont, and Curtiss-Wright, one might argue that the Court [in 
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York] had in mind a federal common law displacing states in foreign affairs cases 
(including customary international law cases).”). 
122 See sources cited supra note 4.  
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As the label we gave it suggests, the “international consensus” story relies less 
exclusively on just state practice and focuses broadly on “consensus.” Here, a sub-group of the 
modern camp bases its philosophy on a particular passage from Sabbatino: 
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of 
international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the 
courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the 
sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with international 
justice.123  
 After asserting a lack of international consensus with regard to foreign expropriations,124 
Justice Harlan adds in a footnote that the Sabbatino decision “in no way intimates that the courts 
of this country are broadly foreclosed from considering questions of international law” because 
“[t]here are, of course, areas of international law in which consensus as to standards is greater 
and which do not represent a battleground for conflicting ideologies.”125 
In defense of the modern position, Koh interprets Justice Harlan’s language to mean that 
“[o]nce customary norms have sufficiently crystallized, courts should presumptively incorporate 
them into federal common law, unless the norms have been ousted as law for the United States 
by contrary federal directives.”126 This interpretation forecloses federal judges from relying 
exclusively on independent judicial law-making when construing CIL, “as their task is not to 
create rules willy-nilly, but rather to discern rules of decision from an existing corpus of 
customary international law rules.”127 In other words, federal judges can only apply CIL norms 
                                                
123 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (emphasis added). 
124 See id. (“There are few if any issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the 
limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property of aliens.”). 
125 Id. at 430 n.34 (emphasis added). 
126 See Koh, supra note 4, at 1835 (explaining his view that “even after Erie and Sabbatino, federal courts retain 
legitimate authority to incorporate bona fide rules of customary international law into federal common law.”). See 
also id. at 1842 (“Thus, when customary international norms are well-defined, the executive branch has regularly 
urged the federal courts to determine such rules as matters of federal law.”).  
127 Id. at 1853 (arguing that “[w]hen construing customary international law, federal courts arguably exercise less 
judicial discretion than when making other kinds of federal common law. . . .”).  
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as federal common law after verifying that “a clear international consensus” has sufficiently 
“crystallized” them.128  
Admittedly, we struggled to determine whether “consensus” and “state practice” were 
interchangeable terms in the sense that Koh meant, especially since the sources he cited to for 
“consensus” are precisely the type of “verbal” evidence that some—including Koh—believe 
counts as state practice.129 Historically, “consensus” refers to a theory that arose during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which described CIL as a universal law based on the 
“common consent” of (most) nations. 130 Another Erie scholar, Ernest Young, claimed in his 
piece with Emily Kadens that the modern version of consensus differs significantly from 
traditional perceptions of custom, for the latter looks backward at past practices while the former 
looks to new emerging practices.131 Young and Kadens add that this normative, forward-looking 
concept of international consensus is a key tool for enforcing CIL norms in human rights 
litigation.132  
When Koh proceeds to tout the United States as a key participant in the “traditional state 
practice” that shapes CIL rules, he seems to suggest that state practice is, at minimum, one 
category of evidence from which judges may infer this international consensus.133 Along this 
vein, Koh cites to multilateral treaty drafting processes, the United Nations, regional fora, 
standing and ad hoc intergovernmental organizations, and diplomatic conferences as “driving 
                                                
128 Koh, Transnational, supra note 54, at 2385–86 (asserting that “over the centuries,” federal courts “determine 
whether a clear international consensus has crystallized around a legal norm that protects or bestows rights upon a 
group of individuals that includes plaintiffs.”).  
129 Young, supra note 14, at 386. 
130 Kelly, supra note 11, at 510–12. 
131 Kadens & Young, supra note 1, at 909. 
132 Id. 
133 See Koh, supra note 4, at 1853–54 (attacking the revisionist charge that the CIL lawmaking process does not 
adequately represent state interests because “insofar as customary international law rules arise from traditional 
[s]tate practice, the United States has been, for most of this century, the world’s primary maker of and participant in 
this practice.”).  
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forces” that shape CIL.134  Koh gave us an idea of what to look for when determining whether 
federal courts really did base CIL determinations on a “clear international consensus.”  
  In their response to Bradley and Goldsmith’s 1997 piece, Ryan Goodman and Derek 
Jinks  extract the same “codification and international consensus” requirement from Sabbatino, 
arguing that the Sabbatino majority upholds CIL as part of the federal common law while 
limiting justiciable CIL claims to those that fulfill this consensus requirement.135 Goodman and 
Jinks rest their thesis on the same Sabbatino quotation that Koh clings to, expressing it through 
what they call Sabbatino’s “sliding scale.”136 This sliding scale distinguishes between areas of 
international law that are rife with political divisions among nations, and “areas of international 
law in which consensus as to standards is greater and which do not represent a battleground for 
conflicting ideologies.”137 According to Goodman and Jinks, Sabbatino establishes the latter 
category of international law as the justiciable one.138  
 Furthermore, Goodman and Jinks credit the Filartiga line of ATS cases for fully 
incorporating Sabbatino’s “sliding scale” framework into federal judicial practice.139 They also 
claim that a tripartite test for judicially cognizable CIL flows from this line of litigation—which 
                                                
134 Id. at 1854 (noting that “in nearly all of these organizations and fora, the United States ranks among the leading 
participants.”).  
135 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 7, at 512 (“Properly interpreted, Sabbatino stands both for the proposition that 
international law is federal common law and for the proposition that courts should refrain from adjudicating 
international law claims without the requisite degree of codification or international consensus.”).  
136 See id. at 482 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); Von Dardel v. Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp 246, 258 (D.D.C. 1985) (“[T]he Sabbatino Court established a ‘sliding 
scale.’ That is, the greater degree of codification and consensus supporting a CIL norm, the more allowance courts 
have in finding attendant claims actionable.”). 
137 See id. (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 430 n.34) (explaining the “sliding scale”).  
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 494–98, 512 (“Several insights can be drawn from the Filartiga case line. First, the incorporation of 
Sabbatino’s sliding-scale”). See also id. at 496 (explaining that Filartiga’s approach is “based primarily on the 
principle of consent” and “[T]hese standards coincide with the Sabbatino Court’s concern for finding a consensus . . 
. .”).  
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effectively narrows the range of actionable CIL claims to those based in jus cogens norms—but 
we do not seek to address that particular thesis in this paper. 140 
Rather, what interests us even more is their claim that post-Filartiga courts engage in a 
“prevailing judicial practice” of determining when a CIL norm carries enough international 
consensus to tip the “sliding scale” in the direction of justiciability.141 According to Goodman 
and Jinks, the routine practice among federal judges is to consult the “ample documents and 
international legal instruments” available to them and, from there, determine whether a given 
CIL norm meets the consensus requirement inferred from Sabbatino and Filartiga.142 What’s 
more, they claim that this judicial practice yields “uniform results” that “belie the revisionist 
portrayal of CIL as ‘often unwritten . . . unsettled . . . difficult to verify’ and the ‘contours [of 
which] are often uncertain.”143 
Goodman and Jinks go on to explain how Filartiga itself exemplifies this routine 
practice.144 Here, the Second Circuit confirmed “the universal condemnation of torture . . . by 
virtually all of the nations of the world” by consulting “numerous international agreements.”145 
More specifically, the court looked to UN materials, such as the United Nations Charter, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UN General Assembly’s unanimous Declaration 
on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture.146 Additionally, the court also 
                                                
140 See generally id. for Goodman and Jinks’ theory on jus cogens norms and the tripartite test.  
141 See generally id. at 494–97; also id. at 512 (“[A] thorough account of the prevailing judicial practice of finding 
and applying CIL demonstrates the systematic nature of these inquiries.”). 
142 See generally id. at 494–500 (“The availability of ample documents and international legal instruments enables 
effective adjudication of the status of CIL”). 
143  Id. at 512 (citing to Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 855). 
144 Id. at 499–500 (“Notably, the Filartiga court’s method of analyzing the international law claims has also become 
the routine judicial method.”). 
145 Filartiga, 630 F.2d  at 880. 
146 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 7, at 500. 
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relied on many domestic sources, such as the Department of State’s human rights reports, 
congressional statutes, and the amicus brief filed on behalf of the US.147  
According to Goodman and Jinks, Filartiga’s review of “both international and domestic 
legal instruments” is in fact the routine, established process through which federal judges 
identify actionable CIL.148 Thus, they criticize how revisionists “mischaracterize” this approach 
by suggesting “that judges adopt the reverse presumption, finding actionable CIL violations 
when presented with even minimal documentation.” In another stab against the revisionist 
stance, the authors also offer Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic as a counter-example to 
Filartiga, whereby the D.C. Circuit uses the same judicial method to find that the prohibition of 
nonofficial torture lacked sufficient consensus to constitute a justiciable CIL norm.149  Taken 
together, this “consensus” view that we see from Koh, Goodman and Jinks—if true—ought to 
translate into increasing citations to UN materials, treaties and other international materials. As 
for domestic sources, we would likely see more “sources of U.S. political branch action”150 
rather than more case law. 
Finally, we have the “revisionist” story about what federal courts cite to as sources of 
CIL and how those citations evolved after Erie. On the “status” question, revisionists argue that 
CIL needs positive incorporation through the US Constitution or a federal statute for it to 
become federal law.151 Thus, if courts took their cues from revisionist thought, then perhaps we 
would see an increased citation to domestic statutes and to the Constitution after Erie.152 
                                                
147 Id.  
148 Id. (“As the following cases demonstrate, Filartiga’s investigation of such international and domestic legal 
instruments typifies the ways in which other CIL claims are deemed actionable in federal court.”). 
149 See id. at 530 n.189.  
150 Id. at 500. 
151 See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5.  
152 This last hypothesis would have required extra caution, however, since such an increase could also result from 
the longstanding tradition of using CIL as a tool for statutory interpretation under the Charming Betsey canon, 
whereby U.S. courts interpret federal statutes and treaties to avoid conflicts with the law of nations. For the origin of 
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Furthermore, in an ideal revisionist world, Erie’s positivist underpinnings ought to translate into 
more references to state practice in CIL cases.153  
When describing what actually played out in the courts, however, revisionists claim that 
federal courts moved in the opposite direction after Filartiga, especially in the context of ATS 
litigation. According to Bradley and Goldsmith, the rise in human rights litigation after World 
War II brought a “new” CIL with it.154 Unlike the “traditional CIL” of the past, which primarily 
governed interstate matters and was based in state practice, the “new” CIL mostly regulates 
states’ treatment of their own citizens and is less tied to state practice.155  
In a subsequent article, Bradley, Goldsmith, and David Moore describe how the Second 
Circuit applied “new” CIL in Filartiga by prioritizing verbal evidence of state assent over actual 
state practice. 156 Per the article, examples of “verbal assent” evidence in Filartiga include the 
United Nations Charter, the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights, another non-
binding United Nations resolution, multiple treaties that the US had not ratified, and various 
national constitutions.157 If this list sounds familiar, it is because it is roughly the same one that 
Goodman and Jinks focus on when they describe the “prevailing judicial practice” of 
determining actionable CIL by digging for “international consensus.”158 In fact, Bradley, 
Goldsmith and Moore use the terms “verbal assent” and “consensus” interchangeably.159 
                                                                                                                                                       
the canon, see Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). For an empirical study on 
CIL as statutory interpretation tool in the US, see Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Customary International Law and Statutory 
Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis of Federal Court Decisions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1118 (2014). 
153 Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 41, at 890–91 (implying that the Second Circuit espoused a “revisionist 
position with respect to the sources of CIL in ATS litigation” after Filartiga, when it began citing to more 
“concrete” evidence of state practice).  
154  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 831–32. 
155 Id. 
156 See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 41, at 889–91. 
157 Id. at 889. 
158 See discussion infra pp.26–28. 
159 Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 41, at 890 (describing how the Second Circuit eventually “pulled back 
from the approach in Filartiga, which, as we noted earlier, had relied heavily on verbal statements and ‘consensus’ 
and had downplayed actual practice.”).  
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Of course, the revisionists do not stop there. Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore go on to 
argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain promoted a new approach 
to deriving CIL in ATS cases, shifting away from Filartiga’s reliance on verbal assent evidence 
and returning to the more “revisionist” method of citing to actual state practice.160 Others agree 
with this positivist reading of Sosa, extending it beyond just ATS litigation and into any CIL-
related cases decided in US federal courts.161  
For this study, we decided to split the post-Filartiga data into sub-periods: 1980-2003 
and 2004-2015 to determine whether Sosa really did mark a retreat from “consensus” or “verbal 
assent” or whether it was merely an outlier in its pro-practice approach to CIL. If our data 
revealed more citations to “verbal assent” variables than to variables representing “actual 
practice,”162 then perhaps CIL lacks the “positivist foundation” that Dodge, Henkin, and others 
have relied on when challenging revisionist arguments. That said, such results might vindicate 
the “consensus” camp of the modern position, which, needless to say, would prove why Bradley 
and Goldsmith had something to worry about back in 1997.  
V. PREDICTIONS 
To summarize, the Erie literature provides three different narratives in response to the 
“sources” question about CIL, all three of which scholars have used to bolster their arguments on 
the “status” question. To test the validity of each narrative, we created a study identifying 
                                                
160 Id. at 910 (claiming in “Table 2” of their piece that Sosa “resolved” the debate about the “scope and sources of 
CIL” to be applied by courts in ATS litigation and that Sosa calls for a “[l]imited set of CIL norms, with increased 
emphasis on the practice of nations”). To be fair, not all scholars who interpret Sosa as endorsing a return to 
traditional state practice would self-identify as revisionists. See John O. McGinnis, Sosa and the Derivation of 
Customary International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, 
supra note 28,  488–89 (interpreting Sosa as endorsing an “inductive methodology” for CIL that not only calls for 
“hard evidence of actual state practice . . .” but that also “reflects the movement to positivism contained in Erie.”).  
161 Id. at 493 (observing that Sosa’s positivism “may have important implications for deriving customary 
international law even outside the context of the ATS.”).  
162 See discussion infra Part VI.   
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various sources that courts cite to as evidence of CIL, and then we tracked how citation rates to 
these sources evolved over time.  
We strategically divided the data into specific eras based on three game-changing cases: 
Erie, Filartiga, and Sosa. If the “state practice” story holds up, then these time divisions should 
make little difference: with or without Erie, state practice would always be there as CIL’s 
positive foundation. If the data reflected this assertion, then we would be vindicating not only 
Dodge and Henkin, but also the traditional ICJ definition of CIL. If the “international consensus” 
story played out in practice, then the 1980’s would be a crucial turning point in our data. 
Although Goodman, and Jinks credit Sabbatino for giving courts the “sliding scale” to work 
with, it also credits Filartiga and its progeny for solidifying the sliding scale as the accepted 
form of judicial practice. Thus, we would probably see an increase in citations to “verbal assent” 
variables after the 1980’s.  Finally, if our data vindicated the “revisionist story,” then we would 
see higher citation rates to traditional state practice sources before Erie, higher citation rates to 
“verbal assent” sources after Filartiga (and after World War II, generally), and then an increase 
in  traditional state practice sources in ATS litigation and other cases after Sosa. 
Taking these three narratives together with general academic CIL accounts, we 
summarize our predictions as follows: 
• First, in the 1790-1938 pre-Erie period, with federal courts applying the “general 
common law,” we would expect to see a higher rate of citation to foreign (especially 
British) cases and academic treatise writers, as well as a fairly high rate of citation 
traditional evidence of state practice. 
• Second, in the post-Erie period, we should expect to see a difference between the 1938-
1980 period (before the emergence of the modern position via Filartiga) and the 1980-
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2015 period (after its emergence). Furthermore, if the prevailing Erie scholars on both 
sides of the debate are correct, then this difference should show up most significantly in 
cases involving individual rights and especially in the ATS cases. 
• Third, we should generally expect to see an increase in citations to international sources 
after Filartiga.  If Dodge and Henkin are correct, then the vast majority of these sources 
will be the types that are traditionally associated with state practice; what’s more, we 
would expect to see these state practice variables consistently throughout the ages. If 
Koh, Goodman and Jinks’s “international consensus” view is correct, then we should see 
citations to UN materials, international committee materials, treaties, and other types of 
international legal instruments increase after 1980, since Filartiga would have 
supposedly propagated Sabbatino’s “sliding scale” approach by then. Finally, if the 
revisionists are right and Sosa really did signal a switch back to grounding CIL in state 
practice, then we can expect to see traditional state practice variables making a comeback 
in our data between 2004-2015.  
 
Armed with these predictions, we examined the data.  
V. METHODOLOGY 
 We designed this study with a particular aim in mind: to set aside what judges say that 
they are doing and to uncover what they are actually doing in cases where U.S. federal courts 
apply CIL.163  To do so, we first created a database of federal cases that were decided in the 
United States between the early 1790’s up until 2015. Although much of the scholarship 
regarding Erie and CIL focuses on Supreme Court cases, we tried to ensure that our database 
included case law from the Supreme Court, the Circuit Courts, and from various U.S. federal 
                                                
163 The basic methodology is taken from Choi & Gulati, supra note 15. 
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district courts164 so that we could capture a more comprehensive picture of how courts across the 
entire federal judicial system discern CIL.  Next, we identified individual opinions within each 
case in the database —including majority opinions, concurring opinions, and dissents—that 
discussed CIL, and created a database of CIL determinations. We included cases that both found 
CIL and did not find CIL, and if a given opinion covered multiple issues that yielded separate 
CIL determinations, we entered each issue as a separate entry on the spreadsheet. 
 To construct our database in a fashion where we were both obtaining an adequate sample 
from each level of court and also sampling the cases that the key authors in the debate were 
looking to, we used two strategies.  First, to obtain a sample of cases that the key players in the 
CIL debate themselves considered important enough, we fished through their articles for all the 
cases that they attached importance to.  Our proxy for determining whether a case was important 
was whether it was discussed in the text of the article as relevant to the debate.  The authors 
whose canonical articles we mined were those by Bradley and Goldsmith, Stephens, Koh, and 
Young.165   We then also went through the chapters of the volume edited by Dodge, Sloss and 
Ramsey that is widely considered to be the best compilation of authoritative accounts of how 
CIL has evolved over history in the U.S.166  Here, we did not code every case mentioned, but 
instead looked to get an equal representation of cases from every decade between 1790 and the 
date of publication of the volume, 2011.  The foregoing method yielded primarily cases from the 
Supreme Court and to a lesser extent the Circuit courts.  To supplement the latter, we added in a 
random set of cases we obtained from Westlaw using searches for cases that used the terms 
“customary international law”, “custom” (in conjunction with international law), or the “law of 
                                                
164 The database also includes a tiny batch of cases from the original U.S. Circuit Courts that Congress established 
shortly after it enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789. See e.g. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).  
165 See sources cited supra notes 4, 5, and 14.   
166 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (David L. Sloss, Michael D. 
Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011). 
34 
 
nations”.  Overall, we tried to obtain roughly the same number of observations from each of the 
types of courts (Supreme Court, Circuit court, and district court) and also across the pre and post 
Erie periods.  Our initial goal was to obtain between 250 and 300 observations; the total we 
ended up with was 267.  Of these observations, 97 were from the Supreme Court, 71 from the 
Circuit courts and 98 from the district courts.  In terms of Erie, 121 observations were from 
before Erie and 146 after.  
After isolating each CIL determination, we selected “variables” based on what the 
relevant literature commonly cites to as sources of CIL. Then, for each CIL determination, we 
tallied the number of unique evidentiary items (pertaining to the variables) that the court cited to 
as definitive evidence of CIL. For example, if a legal opinion cited to Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England and to Vattel’s The Law of Nations, the evidentiary item 
count in the “Academic Sources” column of the spreadsheet for that case would be a “2.”167  
Ultimately, we estimated counts of sources being cited to in each entry by giving a maximum 
score of “1” if a specific type of source was cited to (so, if a case cited to 6 domestic statutes, 
that case would receive a score of “6” for the “Domestic Statutes” category), which gave us the 
fraction of CIL determinations that used each source.  
 Ultimately, we selected eleven types of sources as our variables to code for: 
 Academic Sources:  This category covers a broad range of materials from legal 
academia, including everything from treatises and international law digests to law review 
articles. Sometimes—especially in the pre-Erie cases—judges would refer to specific treatise 
writers without citing to or quoting from a specific work. In such instances, we would code these 
mentions of the authors as an academic source.  On the other hand, whenever courts cited to 
                                                
167 Note: we only coded whether specific sources were cited to more than once. For example, if a court cited to 
Blackstone’s Commentaries ten times within the same opinion, we would tally that source only once under the 
“Academic Sources” column, not ten times.  
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multiple works from the same author, we coded each individual work as a separate academic 
source. This category not only includes both U.S. and international sources, but it also represents 
a variation of perspectives: from the “natural law” philosophies of Grotius and Vattel, to the pro-
modern position literature that Bradley and Goldsmith expected judges to increasingly rely on 
after 1997.168   
 Domestic Cases: Whenever judges cited to a case decided in any U.S. court, we coded 
that case under the “Domestic Cases” variable. For example, if a judge sitting on the Eleventh 
Circuit cited to three Eleventh Circuit cases, five Supreme Court cases, one federal district court 
case, and one state court case, we would code all ten of these cases as domestic cases. 
Ultimately, we coded such a small number of state court cases that we did not feel justified in 
splitting this variable into two separate ones for federal cases and state cases.  
 Domestic Statutes: Here, we coded any federal or state statutes that judges cited to as 
evidence of CIL. As with the materials we coded under the Domestic Cases variable, most of 
what we coded here were federal as opposed to state sources.  
 Treaties:  This variable included any treaties and other international agreements between 
states. Along the way, we took note of the number of treaties that courts specifically referred to 
as codifications of state practice. In keeping with the revisionist label of “verbal assent” 
evidence, we note here that treaties fall under this category.  
 UN Resolutions: As with treaties, this type of evidence would also count as “verbal 
assent” for revisionists. 
 UN/League Conference and Committee Reports: As with treaties and UN resolutions, 
this type of evidence would also count as “verbal assent” for revisionists. 
                                                
168 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 875 (“Because of their relative unfamiliarity with international law and 
because of the special difficulties associated with determining international law rules, judges tend to be heavily 
influenced by academic sources in this context.”). 
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International Tribunal Sources:  This variable accounted for any cases, charters, or 
statutes coming out of international tribunals such as the ICJ, the ECJ, the ICTY or the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, to name a few.  
International Committee Reports: This variable accounted for any non-UN reports 
from committees such as the International law Association or the Red Cross. We also marked 
this as a “verbal assent” variable. 
Actions by States: This variable describes the traditional evidence for state practice. 
Basically, whenever we encountered a court finding CIL when “State ‘X’ did ‘Y,’” we coded it 
under this variable.  
Statements from State Officials: A typical source of opinio juris, we used this variable 
to track Attorney General letters, letters from secretaries of state, presidential proclamations, or 
even military handbooks, among other official statements.  
Parties Agreement: This variable accounts for whenever parties to the litigation in a 
case agree that a rule or norm amounts to CIL. We found that the vast majority of the cases we 
coded barely cited to this type of evidence. Consequently, this paper will not devote too much 
analysis to this variable.  
After selecting our variables, we had to make a judgment call about how to divide the 
time periods we coded. The two breaks in time that we chose to do our comparisons across were 
first, of course, before and after Erie in 1938.  Secondarily, and within the post-Erie era, we 
looked at the pre and post-1980 periods, all in keeping with the idea that the Second Circuit’s 
1980 Filartiga decision and the Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations in 1987 constituted the 
two pillars of the move toward the modern position.169 Finally, we further broke the post-1980 
                                                
169 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5 at 831–34. 
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period into pre and post-2004 periods, so that we could test the revisionists’ theories regarding 
Sosa. 
VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 Our results tell a story of the kinds of materials U.S. federal courts have looked to over 
roughly a 200-year period as their authority in making CIL determinations. We begin by 
describing the overall numbers and then break the results down into component parts, first by 
types of court and then in terms of the types of cases. Table 1A reports the overall counts in 
terms of the numbers of pieces of evidence of each type cited; Figure 1A provides a graphical 
representation of the same. 
 A. Overall Picture 
[insert Table 1A and Figure 1A – from Appendix] 
 From the first column, of Table 1A, we see that the dominant form of evidence cited 
across the 200 plus years is the domestic case.  Academic materials come next.  These two 
sources of evidence, added together, are more important in aggregate number of citations than 
the other eleven sources of evidence put together. Direct evidence of the two types of materials 
that, theoretically, should be driving every determination of CIL–evidence of state practice and 
opinio juris (the two elements of the textbook formulation of when CIL forms)–seems relatively 
unimportant to U.S. federal courts investigating CIL matters.  And that is so whether one views 
state practice narrowly as just what is counted by the Actions of States variable or also including 
Foreign Statutes, Foreign Cases, or any other variables that may fall under the “verbal assent” 
label.  
Interestingly, Table 1A and Figure 1A show us that domestic cases dominate the field 
both before and after Erie, and we also see that academic sources remain in second place, both 
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before and after Erie.   In terms of overall numbers of citations to the dominant form of evidence 
used by US courts in CIL determinations—their own pronouncements in prior cases—then, there 
seems to have been no radical change in the behavior of the federal courts in CIL determination 
before and after the 1938 Supreme Court case that scholars have spent decades arguing over.   
A critic might  dismiss any concerns over the results in Table 1A, pointing to the well-
known tendencies of US federal judges to cite multiple prior federal court cases in their opinions, 
even on trivial matters where a single cite might suffice.  Furthermore, there is also the problem 
of outliers where we might have a handful of courts that cite to lots of a particular type of a 
material.  To correct for these two foregoing possibilities, we provide an alternate representation 
of the data in Table 1B, Table 1C and Figure 1B.  Instead of reporting raw counts of the number 
of materials cited, we report the percentage of determinations where a type of material was cited 
at least once.  We also look to see whether there are statistically significant differences across the 
time periods in terms of the fractions of materials that are cited to as authority. The method of 
looking at the data utilized here, in terms of fractional use, avoids the problem of having a 
handful of cases where there are a disproportionate number of cites to a particular type of 
evidence.  For example, therefore, if a particular Supreme Court case such as The Scotia cites to 
40 different pieces of evidence of state practice, we count it here as just 1 (whereas in the prior 
representation it would have been 40). 
It is worth reiterating here that at least some of the authors in the Erie debate would 
probably not have predicted big changes at the time Erie was decided.  Rather, they imply that 
Erie’s relevance to CIL determinations came to prominence in the 1980s, when the Second 
Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala and the Restatement (Third) was published. That debate 
then supposedly gets impacted by the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain in 
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2004 (the direction of the impact of Sosa is contested).  To test these effects, we break the data 
down into the pre- and post-1938 periods (Erie), and then the pre- and post-1980 periods 
(Filartiga/Restatement) and the pre and post 2003 (Sosa) periods.  
Viewing the results in terms of the correction mentioned above, and in terms of 
significance tests across time periods, we see a more nuanced picture of the changes over time.  
As a threshold matter though, we see that despite the corrections described, domestic cases and 
academic materials still show up as the most utilized pieces of evidence by a significant margin 
(the former are cited to in 76% of all CIL determinations, the latter in 69%). By contrast, 
evidence of Actions by States—the core of what we would expect evidence of state practice to 
be—shows up at near the bottom (cited to in only 7% of determinations).  
In terms of effects over time though, we see that academic materials drop significantly in 
importance during the post-Erie period.  This drop, however, does not occur immediately after 
Erie.  Indeed, there is actually an increase in the 1938-1980 period from citations to academic 
materials in 75% of all CIL determinations to 88%.  Rather, the drop is in the post 1980 period; 
and it is big—from citations to academic materials in 88% of determinations to 57%.   
[insert Table 1B, Table 1C, Figure 1B – from Appendix] 
 To the extent that the academic citations for the pre-Erie period were primarily to the 
natural law masters such as Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel and so on, we may be seeing a clear move 
away from “finding CIL” in the works of natural law scholars and foreign (mostly British) 
common law cases perspective.170  And indeed, we do find a simultaneous big drop in the post-
                                                
170 Although we did not count specific numbers here, our impression from coding the cases is that as citations to 
international digests died out, the most-cited treatise we coded was the Restatement (Third). Since the Restatement 
arguably reflects the modern position, this could be (with further research) a potentially revealing tidbit. 
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1980 period from citations to foreign cases in 37% of determinations to citations in 7%.171 
However, that we do not know whether courts were citing to academic materials in the pre-1980 
period because of the natural law perspectives on international law or because these materials 
provided useful aggregations of state practice and opinio juris at the time. Part of the reason for 
this ambiguity is that, frankly, most judges in the cases we coded cited to academic sources 
without explaining why. Clearly, they did not have us or our study in mind when they crafted 
their opinions. Whatever the reason, there is a dramatic drop in the post-1980 period in US 
federal courts looking to academic materials and to foreign cases (and foreign statutes for that 
matter) for assistance in their CIL determinations. 
In terms of other significant results, it is interesting (and puzzling from a revisionist 
standpoint, we think) that the shift toward citing more domestic statutes does not occur 
simultaneously with the shift away from citations to academic material. Instead the shift toward 
domestic statutes occurs immediately after Erie, in the post-1938 period, forty years or so before 
the shift away from academic sources (and foreign cases/statutes).  The real story of how federal 
judges have chosen their sources for CIL determinations played out in stages: stage one, the 
move toward citing domestic statutes more, shows up post-1938, and stage two, the shift away 
from citing academic materials (assuming they were of the natural law variety) and away from 
foreign cases/statutes, shows up forty years later, in the 1980s.  The largest shift in the post-Erie 
period, however, is toward more citations to domestic cases (from citations in 59% of CIL 
determinations pre Erie to roughly 90% after).  And that shift is not one that is predicted or even 
commented on by any of the players in the CIL debate described earlier in the first part of this 
article.   
                                                
171 Our impression from the coding was that the vast majority of these cases were British. This fact (and the drop in 
the citations to these materials) might counter the claim that judges have continued applying CIL as a type of general 
common law inherited from England. We did not count specific numbers here though. 
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Although the shift toward citing more domestic statutes as support for CIL 
determinations is consistent with the revisionist position, one can by no means conclude that the 
post-Erie shift was all in the revisionist direction.172  That is because the other big significant 
shifts we see around the time of Erie are toward more citations to international materials 
indicative of verbal assent: UN resolutions, international committees, international tribunals, and 
international treaties.  The most significant of these shifts is the increased citation to treaties, 
which is roughly the same size shift (10-15% to around 30-35%) as we saw with citations to 
domestic statutes.   
To summarize, our data seems to lend at least some support for both the “revisionist” 
story and the “international consensus” story.   On the one hand, U.S. federal courts seem to heed 
what revisionists consider the dictates of Erie by citing more to domestic statutes after 1938.  
And then there seems to be something of an Erie tailwind in the post-1980 period, with 
significant reductions in citations to academic materials and foreign domestic sources.  On the 
other hand, not all of the movement on the citation front is inward-looking. On the “international 
consensus” front, we see significant increases in the post-1938 era citations to at least some of 
the types of sources that Goodman and Jinks associate with consensus, such as international 
tribunal decisions and materials coming out of the UN and international committees. Among the 
international consensus or “verbal assent” variables, the most significant trend we see is a move 
toward greater citations to treaties.  In the 1980-2015 period, treaties are cited in 45% of all 
determinations (in the pre-1938 period, that fraction was 14%).   
                                                
172 The revisionist position, at least the Bradley and Goldsmith 1997 variety, isn’t just that Erie mandated a move 
toward domestic sources of law, but rather that Erie requires that CIL be positively incorporated into domestic law 
through two specific domestic sources—the US Constitution and federal statutes—before courts can rightfully apply 
CIL as federal common law.  So, from this perspective, the finding that domestic cases are the most-cited source 
may be troubling for the revisionists even before we get to the increase in citations to international sources. That is, 
the domestication that revisionists look for is not the same kind of domestication we found here.    
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One question we had was whether the increased citations to international materials 
vindicated the “state practice” story in any meaningful way. We tried to unpack the citations to 
treaties further to examine this question.  Treaties, of course, come in all sorts of shapes and 
forms.  Some of them reflect a codification of state practice and some of them reflect the 
opposite; that is, a treaty is necessary precisely because there is no prevailing practice among 
nations about how they are going to behave under certain circumstances.  To examine what 
fraction of our citations to treaties were to practice-reflecting treaties, we coded for whether the 
court explicitly said that the treaty codified state practice or not (something that we had seen 
courts doing in a few cases in our initial coding).  Overall, we found that it was only about 5% of 
treaty citations where the court said that the treaty reflected any sort of generalized state 
practice.173  In other words, while the increase in citations to treaties strikes us as noteworthy for 
the “international consensus” story, it does not, at least at first cut, seem to be the product of 
courts looking for evidence of traditional state practice.  
While we do find a number of significant effects of the breaks in time in the 1930s and 
1980s, we do not see as many key shifts in court behavior around the time of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sosa other than a continued increase in citations to domestic statutes.  In fact, 
citations to domestic statutes surpass citations to treaties in the years between 2004 and 2015, 
which perhaps should provide some comfort to revisionists. Nevertheless, citations to verbal 
assent variables—especially international tribunal cases and international committee materials—
continue to increase during this period (at minimum, their citation rates have stabilized). 
Citations to the acts of states, on the other hand, remain at the meager 5% level, which does not 
mesh with the “revisionist story” of a return to citing traditional state practice for CIL. More 
                                                
173 Choi and Gulati find essentially the same result in their examination of international tribunal determinations of 
CIL.  See Choi & Gulati, supra note 15.  
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importantly, none of these variables surpass domestic cases or academic sources, which continue 
to occupy the number one and number two slots, respectively. In that sense, Sosa might not be as 
dramatic of a turning point as the “revisionist story” posits.   
 The next question is whether these seemingly contradictory effects are occurring 
primarily in different types of courts or cases. 
 B. Type of Court 
 The existing academic research into CIL determinations in US domestic courts has 
tended to focus primarily on the pronouncements of the US Supreme Court and to a lesser extent 
on determinations from a small number of Circuit court cases.  The vast majority of 
determinations, however, are made at the district court level—and district court judging, 
researchers have found, tends to be far more constrained than that on the High Court.174  So, the 
question was whether we would see different patterns in CIL determinations at the different court 
levels.  
[insert Table 2A and Figure 4.3 – from Appendix] 
 For the sake of simplicity, we present only one table with the breakdowns across the 
different types of courts, Table 2A.  This table reports on the percentages of types of materials 
being cited at least once in each CIL determination.  We see in Table 2A that there are some 
statistically significant differences that stand out.  Unsurprisingly, given what we saw earlier, we 
find that citations to domestic cases dominate across all three types of courts.  Further, these 
increases are large and statistically significant in the post-Erie period for two of the three sets of 
courts (trial courts and the Supreme Court). To a lesser extent, we see also significant increases 
to citations to international materials.  But overall the general trends seem to be in the same 
direction in all three types of courts (to the extent that there are differences, they are likely the 
                                                
174 E.g., Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES (2013).  
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product of the differences in the numbers of cases). Parsing the data further, in terms of the 
additional time breaks we showed in the prior subsection (Filartiga, Sosa), does not add much 
and we do not report that additional material here.   
 C. Type of Case 
 To the extent there is some overlap between the “international consensus” story and the 
“revisionist story, it is in that both revisionists and modern position advocates suggest that the 
types of CIL determinations occurring in ATS and individual rights cases (which almost all 
would have shown up in the post-Erie period) were different.  Given that there was little state 
practice to support the proposed CIL rules on many human rights matters (past state practice in 
many cases, if anything, went in the other direction), scholars have suggested that CIL 
determinations in this area might have looked more to looser types of evidence—UN materials, 
international committee reports and human rights treaties—than they would have in more 
traditional types of CIL determination.175 As we mentioned earlier, revisionists refer to these 
looser types of evidence as “verbal assent.”  
[Insert Table 3 and Figures 3A, 3B, 4.1 and 4.2 – from Appendix]  
 To examine the foregoing question, we broke the data down in two ways.  First, we 
coded each of our CIL determinations for whether the issue was one involving interstate relations 
(e.g., diplomatic immunity) or individual rights (e.g., torture of a domestic citizen).  Second, we 
coded the determinations for whether the case had been brought under the ATS or not.  Tables 3 
and Figures 3A and 3B report the results we found.  Basically, we found few indications that 
courts were doing anything significantly different in individual rights or ATS cases than they 
were in other types of cases.  Perhaps some of these theorized differences might have manifested 
themselves had courts been actually searching for evidence of state practice in cases with topics 
                                                
175 See Roberts, supra note 12, at 757–60 (2001). 
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under “traditional” international law. But our data shows quite clearly that traditional sources of 
state practice are simply not that important to courts making CIL determinations.  And, as a 
corollary, big differences between the types of cases don’t show up as a function of individual 
rights/ATS. 
VII. IMPLICATIONS 
 After testing three Erie-based approaches to the CIL “sources” question, our study’s main 
takeaway is that whenever U.S. federal courts decide issues based on CIL, the number one 
source that they consult has always been domestic case law, with academic sources trailing 
behind in second place.176 In other words, the CIL that U.S. federal courts apply appears to be 
mostly a creation of their own making (or common law making, if you will), and the rest of it 
comes from “the professors, the writers of textbooks and casebooks, and the authors of articles in 
leading international law journals.”177 Only after consulting these two sources do federal judges 
figure international materials into their CIL analyses. This trend started before Erie, and it has 
continued after Erie.  Not even the supposedly game-changing advent of human rights litigation 
managed to dismantle domestic case law from its first place slot.178  
 However, we did correctly predict an increase in international sources after Erie 
generally, with most of this increase spiking after the 1980 Filartiga decision. To what extent, 
then, has our data vindicated the “state practice” story or the “international consensus” story?  
Up until this point, we have discussed “state practice” and “international consensus” as separate 
and distinct concepts, where the former includes both traditional state practice and the sorts of 
“verbal assent” sources that revisionists deride as mere “cheap talk.”  As we have pointed out 
                                                
176 See supra Table 1A and Figure 1A.  
177 Sohn, supra note 21, at 399. 
178 Ryan Scoville conducted a similar study to ours with roughly the same methodology, only his piece focuses 
exclusively on post-Sosa US case law. In that study, citations to domestic sources came out on top. See Ryan M. 
Scoville, Finding Customary International Law, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming April 2016). 
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repeatedly, however, the international legal community continues to debate the meaning of “state 
practice.” On the one hand, many regard actual state actions as the truest evidence of practice, 
the idea being that words are more indicative of opinio juris.179 As far as others are concerned, 
the idea that so-called “verbal” evidence of CIL counts as “state practice” is pretty much settled, 
in which case “state practice” and “international consensus” would effectively become 
interchangeable terms.180 This ongoing disagreement begs the question: should these conflicting 
definitions of state practice substantially affect how we analyze our own Erie data?  
In a way, it certainly should (and does). If we shelve verbal assent to the side and adopt a 
traditional conception of state practice, then at least some of the modern position’s arguments 
regarding CIL seem to crumble. Consider William Dodge’s claim that CIL is immune from 
Erie's positivist mandate because it has always been grounded in state practice as its positive 
authority.181 True, the citation rates to “actions by states” have never been 0%, but they have 
been only 10% or less in any given era.182 If state practice consists only of the concrete acts that 
nations take, then CIL’s positive foundation may be too meager to survive Erie in the way that 
                                                
179 See discussion supra pp. 4–5. See also Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law Adjudication as Common 
Law Adjudication, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 15, at 53 
(describing the “debate in the literature” about “whether verbal acts by states can be considered a form of state 
practice. Those who object to such classification worry that these acts will end up being ‘double counted’ as both 
practice and evidence of opinio juris.”).  
180 See Omri Sender and Michael Wood, Custom’s Bright Future: The Continuing Importance of Customary 
International Law, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 15, at 368 
(“[S]everal long-standing theoretical controversies related to customary international law have by now been put to 
rest. It is no longer contested, for example, that verbal acts, and not just physical conduct, may count as ‘practice.’”) 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102 cmt. b (1987) 
(explaining that “state action” can take the form of “diplomatic acts and instructions as well as public measures and 
other governmental acts and official statements of policy, whether they are unilateral or undertaken in cooperation 
with other states”). 
181 See discussion supra pp. 20–21.  
182 See Table 1B, Table 1C, Figure 1B.  
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Dodge or Louis Henkin propose. The bad news extends to revisionists as well, quashing their 
hopes for a post-Sosa comeback of traditional state practice variables.183   
 If, however, we expand the meaning of practice to include evidence of verbal assent—
such  as statements by state officials, U.N. resolutions, committee reports from the International 
Law Commission, international tribunal decisions, or recitals in treaties and other international 
agreements—the result resembles the very concept that Goodman, Jinks, Koh and others have 
labeled as “international consensus.” Assuming that the Dodges and Henkins of the world 
adopted this construction of state practice, then the modern position’s two “camps” we described 
earlier in our predictions would merge into a single “consensus” camp.184 If we revisit the data 
under these circumstances, do the theoretical foundations of this “consensus” camp fare any 
better than those of the traditional practice camp?  
The answer to this last question is less straightforward. In theory, as Koh sees it, federal 
courts exercise less judicial discretion when making CIL than they do when making other kinds 
of federal common law, “as their task is not to create rules willy-nilly, but rather to discern rules 
of decision from an existing corpus of customary international law rules.”185 Put differently, CIL 
norms qualify as federal common law only after “a clear international consensus” has 
sufficiently “crystallized” them.186 Derek and Jinks have already argued that we should see this 
theory play out in judicial practice in the form of the Sabbatino “sliding scale.”187  
After re-examining our own data, however, we find ourselves unsure whether to agree or 
disagree on this point. Although we do see increasingly higher citation rates to these 
                                                
183 See discussion supra pp. 29-30. See also Table 1B (Citations to “Actions of States” staid at 5% after 1980, 
indicating no change after Sosa in 2004).  
184 See discussion supra Section IV.c.  
185 Koh, supra note 4, at 1835. 
186 Koh, Transnational, supra note 54, at 2385-86 (asserting that “over the centuries,” federal courts “determine 
whether a clear international consensus has crystallized around a legal norm that protects or bestows rights upon a 
group of individuals that includes plaintiffs.”).  
187 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 7, at 482.  
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international consensus variables over time—with treaties making the most dramatic leaps—the 
citation rates to every single one of these variables still pales in comparison to the citation rate to 
domestic case law at all times.188 For that matter, most of the verbal assent variables also have 
consistently lower citation rates than academic sources do, including after 1980 when citations to 
academic sources dropped. Even when treaties reached citation rates in the 30’s and 50’s 
percentiles, they were still trailing behind citation rates for domestic cases, which were 
consistently valued around 90%, give or take a few percentage points. Even if federal judges are 
consulting an “existing corpus” of CIL rules, they seem to be relying even more heavily on an 
existing corpus of U.S. judges’ interpretations of those rules.  
Therefore, we believe the operative sources-related question for the modern position is 
this: just how much international consensus is enough? In other words, what do the citation rates 
to international sources have to be in order to conclude that judges have sufficiently 
“crystallized” a CIL norm into justiciability in U.S. federal courts? Put yet another way, at what 
point is the gap between citations to domestic cases and citations to international sources so wide 
that we may justifiably accuse judges of “creating CIL rules willy-nilly” rather than discerning 
them from an “existing corpus of customary international law rules”? For now, we leave this 
question open for champions of the modern position to answer—perhaps with a more detailed 
analysis of the data. 
Setting the “consensus” versus “state practice” issue to the side, we still had difficulty 
accounting for the high citations to treaties over time. As we mentioned earlier, our results cut 
against any argument that courts have been citing to treaties as codifications of state practice.189 
Another possibility, then, is that courts have been making a revisionist attempt to incorporate 
                                                
188 See Table 1B. 
189 See Results and Analysis supra p.42.  
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CIL into domestic federal law through treaties.190 We dismissed this idea, however, because 
many of the treaties that we saw courts citing to are ones that the United States has not ratified 
and that, therefore, are not part of federal law.  
Some have argued that treaties are a problematic source for CIL, for they are “good 
evidence of what states want the law to be, but they are not necessarily good evidence of what 
the law is.”191  If anything, the increased citation to treaties may reflect the modern emergence of 
opinio juris as a normative concept: one that focuses less on whether states actually consider 
themselves legally obligated to act and more on whether states believe that such a legal 
obligation ought to exist.192 If that is the case, then the increased citation to treaties after Erie 
yields a new breed of “brooding omnipresence in the sky”: replacing the natural law principles of 
pre-Erie times with an “august corpus” of new, “aspirational” norms from which federal judges 
can “make” CIL.193  
On the other hand, the rise of this new omnipresence seems short-lived, as the citation 
rate for treaties drops from 55% to 38% in the years following the Sosa decision.194  At the same 
time, citations to domestic statutes increased from 39% to 45%.195  In a way, perhaps these 
simultaneous shifts signal a partial victory for revisionists, who not only advocate for positive 
                                                
190 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 819–20 ( “. . . when treaties codify CIL, the President can, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, ratify these treaties and thereby convert the CIL codified within them into federal 
law.”); see also Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 41, at 87 (“[B]ecause ‘the federal lawmaking power is 
vested in the legislative, not the judicial, branch of government,’ federal common law must be grounded in extant 
federal law: the Constitution, a federal statute, or a treaty.”).  
191 Choi & Gulati, supra note 15, at 129 (“[T]he need for a treaty will often arise because of the absence of law, not 
when it is widespread and well established.”). 
192 See Roberts, supra note 12, 775–77; see also Kadens & Young, supra note 1, at 908 ((“More often nowadays, 
opinio	[j]uris	is found in normative statements—U.N. General Assembly Resolutions, aspirational 
treaty language, and the like. Such statements, which are generally divorced from actual state 
practice, are more like statements about the moral obligation or reasonableness of a principle than 
they are an account of why states do what they do.”).  
193 Also along this vein, see Szewczyk, supra note 152, at 123 (suggesting in his own empirical study what he calls 
“emerging custom” embodies this “brooding omnipresence” concept).  
194 See Table 1B. 
195 See id. 
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incorporation of CIL through domestic federal statutes after Erie, but also anticipated a 
decreased reliance on “verbal assent” sources (such as treaties) after Sosa. Again, this victory is 
merely partial, for the revival of traditional state practice citations did not emerge after Sosa. 
Furthermore, federal judges have not been domesticating CIL through statutes and the US 
Constitution so much as they have been domesticating it through an overwhelming reliance on 
US case law.  
On that note, whenever we try to analyze the data within the framework of the Erie 
debate, we continuously come back to the one finding that nobody from the debate anticipated: 
the prevalence of domestic cases as the primary source for determining CIL. After wading 
through the august corpus of Erie/CIL literature, we could not find a single scholar positing a 
post-Erie increase in citations to domestic cases for CIL. More often than not, the existing 
commentary cuts in the opposite direction.196  If our data has confirmed anything, it is that there 
is something less international and more self-referential about the customary “international” law 
that U.S. federal courts have been applying.  
Should this reality bother us? On the one hand, perhaps it should not. After all, is it not 
customary in our courts for federal judges to cite primarily to federal precedent, which would be 
mandatory authority in their jurisdictions? Perhaps by following themselves, US federal judges 
are engaging in a more pragmatic form of common law decision-making – what a legal realist 
                                                
196 Koh, supra note 4, at 1835 (arguing that judges exercise less judicial discretion when adjudicating CIL). See also 
Neuman, supra note 52, at 376 (asserting that federal courts “exercise a limited role” when applying CIL because 
they can “apply only those norms that external evidence demonstrates embody genuine international legal 
obligations binding on the United States.). Like Koh, Neuman insists that federal judges do not just create CIL rules 
based solely on their independent judgment. See id. (“As legal realists, we know that judges have discretion at the 
margins in recognizing and applying these norms; but they do not exercise the innovating powers of State common 
law courts.”). 
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would predict.  Indeed, this is what Bradley in 2015 suggests courts both are doing and should be 
doing with CIL (in contrast to the Bradley of 1997).197  
On the other hand, haven’t both sides of the original Erie debate argued that CIL requires 
something extra before anyone can apply it as federal common law in US courts? Dare we 
suggest that this “something extra” should be state practice and opinio juris? Without citing to 
sufficient evidence of both, judges risk validating Patrick Kelly’s critique of CIL as “lacking 
authority as law, because such norms are not, in fact, based on the […] general acceptance of the 
international community that a norm is obligatory.” 198  Moreover, even if we all agreed that CIL 
enjoys the status of federal common law, we should still expect judges to apply CIL as 
traditionally defined; they would just be adding a U.S. federal law effect to it.  
Perhaps the federal courts’ heavy reliance on their previous case law does serve a useful 
purpose: namely, that of promoting efficiency and uniformity in US interpretations of CIL. We 
ourselves suggested earlier that gathering sufficient evidence of state practice is a nearly 
impossible task.199 Rather than having  US judges conduct that empirical inquiry each time they 
meet a CIL issue, it may make more sense for them to cite to the one or two judges who already 
did all the homework of collecting and compiling international materials to discern a 
“crystallized” CIL norm. From a practical standpoint, prior US decisions are easily accessible to 
US judges, possibly more so than the myriad international sources that judges (and their clerks) 
may not necessarily know to look for. Furthermore, if the first judge to face a given CIL issue 
did correctly discern the content of a CIL norm, then maybe the second judge should be able to 
cite to that first judge rather than replicate those efforts.  The end result would be a consistent US 
stance on CIL rules that contributes to CIL formation globally.  
                                                
197 See generally Bradley, supra note 179. 
198 Kelly, supra note 11, at 452. 
199 See discussion supra Part I. 
52 
 
The federal courts’ domestication of CIL may also increase their opportunities to directly 
apply CIL. A recent study by Pierre-Hughes Verdier and Mila Versteeg reveals that a growing 
number of nations regard domestic law as hierarchically superior to CIL, thus limiting their 
courts’ ability to apply CIL directly.200  In a way, the Guaranty Trust Co. case is an American, 
microcosmic example of Verdier and Versteeg’s findings.201  Perhaps by domesticating CIL in 
the way that they do, federal judges can elevate CIL closer to the top of this hierarchy, thus 
enabling courts to engage with international law more freely (although, obviously, our revisionist 
colleagues assert that we should be positively incorporating CIL into domestic law through other 
means).  
Nevertheless, we ask again: at what point does CIL become too domesticated to 
constitute truly international law? To the possibility that judges cite to each other for efficiency 
purposes, we have two responses: first, whoever makes that claim bears the burden of producing 
actual evidence of this practice before we can assume that it is in fact happening; secondly, even 
if we find it acceptable to delegate the “crystallizing” to a small subset of judges in this way, our 
original question still stands: what percentages of international consensus variables should they 
be citing to? Ironically, we suspect that the highly domestic nature of our courts’ CIL may 
resurrect the fears of some of Bradley and Goldsmith’s critics, namely those who decried the 
American exceptionalism and anti-internationalism that made up the “New Sovereigntist” 
movement.202  Still, if those fears do reappear, are they warranted?  
                                                
200  Pierre-Hughes Verdier & Mila Versteeg, International Law in National Legal Systems: An Empirical 
Investigation, 109 AM. J. INT'L L. 514 (2015) (surveying international law in domestic legal systems of 101 countries 
between 1815-2013). 
201 See discussion supra Part IV.b. 
202 See Spiro, supra note 67; see generally Scoville, supra note 178 (critiquing the under-inclusive [O]ccidentalism 
of CIL as applied in ATS cases).  
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All of the foregoing questions really boil down to one: what is customary international 
law, really? Although we cannot presume to adequately answer that last one, we hope that this 
study has breathed new life into this age-old inquiry. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
When we initially resolved to answer the CIL “sources” question, we identified three 
narratives from the Erie “status” debate that could possibly play out in practice.  Instead, we 
found that whenever U.S. federal judges must determine CIL’s content, they primarily consult 
what other U.S. federal judges have done and then, to a lesser extent, what academic treatments 
say.  Only then do the views and actions of other nations and international organizations come 
into play. We have suggested a few ways in which these judicial practices affect the Erie/CIL 
debate, but for now, we will leave it up to the reader to decide whether these realities ought to 
bother us as a matter of principle. The main inquiry that we emphasize for now is whether highly 
domesticated, self-referential methods of CIL discernment detract from CIL’s legitimacy as law.  
If we were to conduct a similar study to the one we created here for other courts in the 
international legal stage, then perhaps we would find that the U.S. federal judiciary is merely 
dancing to the tune of more global trends in CIL application. As we noted earlier, even the dearth 
of citations to traditional state practice and the plethora of references to academic sources are not 
strictly American trends.203 In fact, many of the trends we saw in our study resemble those 
followed by international courts, such as the ICJ, the ECJ or the ECHR.204 Many of these courts 
cite to their own case law when determining CIL’s content, and recent studies show that the ICJ 
increasingly derives “aspirational” CIL principles from treaties, a source that they cite to more 
                                                
203 See discussion supra Section I.    
204 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 15 (tracking CIL determinations in the ICJ). We also conducted a similar study to 
the one we present here, tracking sources cited to for CIL in ECJ and ECHR cases, but we have not published these 
just yet.  
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than any other.205  Maybe those who credit World War II for changing how all nations determine 
CIL could conduct a study like ours on a greater scale to test if US federal courts’ behavior 
differs significantly from what other jurisdictions do after the 1940s. 
Until these next branches of research occur, we hope that the great Erie debaters will 
reconcile at least some of their theories with the realities of how federal judges actually discern 
CIL. In the process, we hope they will go beyond exploring CIL’s place as “part of our law,” 
revisiting with a more informed eye bigger questions about CIL as law, period.   
  
                                                
205 Choi & Gulati, supra note 15. 
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